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Optimal Unemployment Insurance for Older Workers
*
 
This paper shows that optimal unemployment insurance contracts are age-dependent. Older 
workers have only a few years left on the labor market prior to retirement. This short horizon 
implies a more digressive replacement ratio. However, there is a sufficiently short distance to 
retirement for which flat unemployment benefits can be the optimal contract as the nearly 
retired unemployed workers rationally expect never to suffer from the punishment. This is 
why imposing a tax on the future job is particularly efficient in the context of older workers 
because the agency can now reward the job search by present employment subsidies. 
Moreover, we propose adopting a global approach to unemployment insurance by 
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In many European countries, older workers receive more generous unemployment beneﬁts
before retirement. In some countries (Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the United
Kingdom), older people on unemployment beneﬁts are exempt from the general eligibility
requirement of having to look for work after a certain age. This was also the case previously in
Austria and the Netherlands. In some countries (Ireland, Sweden), job-search requirements
for people on unemployment beneﬁts are less demanding for older people than for younger
people. The “Unemployment tunnel" leading to early exit from the labor market operates as
a result of a general exemption from job-search requirements for the older unemployed which
allows them to remain on unemployment beneﬁts until they reach the oﬃcial retirement
age. For these reasons, unemployment beneﬁts are often considered as early retirement
or pre-retirement schemes (Gruber and Wise, 1998). Is there any rationale behind these
speciﬁc unemployment beneﬁt schemes? In this paper, we analyze the optimal features of
unemployment beneﬁts for older workers. In a moral hazard environment, the unemployment
agency faces a trade-oﬀ between providing insurance against consumption ﬂuctuations and
enticing unemployed workers to search for a job. So, the unconditional beneﬁts given to
older unemployed workers could mean that only the insurance part of the trade-oﬀ is valid
when the retirement age is coming. This paper provides theoretical insights supporting this
view.
Since the seminal work of Shavell & Weiss (1979), it has been recognized that the optimal
unemployment beneﬁts should be such that the replacement ratio decreases with the unem-
ployment spell. Providing incentives to ﬁnd a new job quickly derives from the assumption
that the search intensity made by the agent (the unemployed worker) cannot be observed by
the principal (the unemployment insurance agency). The unemployment insurance contract
is a sequence of transfers between the principal and the agent which aims to cope optimally
with moral hazard. It minimizes the expected discounted value of net transfers provided
by the principal for a given ex-ante utility. Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997) propose introduc-
ing an increasing wage tax after re-employment together with the decreasing sequence of
unemployment beneﬁts. With this wage-tax, the principal provides a better consumption
smoothing without decreasing incentives to search for a job.
The objective of this paper is to study the characteristics of the optimal unemployment
beneﬁt contract for older workers. We then propose to extend the framework of Shavell &
Weiss (1979)’s and Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997) by introducing a deﬁnitive exit rate fromthe
labor market, i.e. retirement. More precisely, unemployed workers face a given probability
of retiring which determines the distance to retirement. This allows us to compute very
easily the optimal contracts for any values of this probability. For the sake of simplicity, we
omit ﬁnancial asset accumulation, even though it is known that the optimal contract is quite
sensitive to this assumption (Shimer & Werning (2008))1.
We show that there is a speciﬁc design for the optimal unemployment insurance for older
1Shimer & Werning (2008) have recently shown that a beneﬁt schedule that decreases with unemployment
duration performs worse than a constant sequence in an economy where saving is allowed.
2workers. Young and old workers are characterized by diﬀerent expected horizons on the labor
market, which leads to an age-speciﬁc optimal unemployment insurance contract. Indeed,
we put forward the idea that the proximity to retirement modiﬁes the trade-oﬀ between
insurance and incentives faced by the unemployment scheme. This proximity makes the
recommendations by Shavell & Weiss (1979) irrelevant. The existence of a retirement date
intrinsically creates a sharp decrease in the search intensity just before this age. To the
extent that there are search frictions on the labor market, the return on jobs is determined
by their expected duration: the time to retirement is then key to understanding older workers’
transitions from unemployment to employment2. The unemployment beneﬁt agency is then
faced with this intrinsic low search intensity. Along the lines of Shavell & Weiss (1979), we
show that it would imply proposing a highly decreasing proﬁle of unemployment beneﬁts. For
unemployed older workers close enough to the retirement age, this policy becomes ineﬃcient:
for a given amount of insurance promised by the agency, there is a suﬃciently short distance
to retirement which does not allow the agency to implement this highly decreasing proﬁle as
the nearly retired unemployed workers rationally expect never to suﬀer from the punishment.
This is why imposing a tax on the future job along the lines of Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997)
is particularly eﬃcient in the context of older workers because the agency can now reward the
job search by present employment subsidies (a negative tax after re-employment). However,
a short horizon before the retirement age decreases the actualized sum of these subsidies and
so limits the eﬃciency of the Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997)’s contract. There are still older
unemployed workers that are exempted from job search requirements and must be provided
with a constant unemployment beneﬁt until their retirement.
Faced with the short horizon of older workers on the labor market, we propose that the
unemployment beneﬁt agency takes advantage of the retirement period to introduce taxes
on pensions in order to reintroduce incentives to search for a job at the end of working
life. This proposition provides some foundation for an integration of unemployment and
retirement schemes, allowing the agency to increase older workers’ employment rate. It then
supports the idea of an uniﬁed insurance system recently put forward by Stiglitz & Yun
(2005)3. In that case, when a worker retires, her pension level would depend on the length
of spells of past unemployment. As the time horizon of a retired worker is longer than that
of the older workers near to retirement, this tax on pensions provides a better smoothing of
consumption without removing any search incentives for older workers, and thus increases
the eﬀectiveness of the optimal contract. We show that the integration of these two social
programs (unemployment and retirement) leads to a signiﬁcant decrease in the cost of the
insurance programs. As suggested by J-J. Laﬀont in Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997), with our
optimal unemployment insurance program, the principal acts as a bank account: workers
can borrow against their future pension to ﬁnance consumption during an unemployment
2This thesis has already received some empirical support (Hairault, Langot and Sopraseuth; 2008) and
some theoretical foundation based on the job search theory (Seater, 1977; Lungqvist and Sargent, 2007; and
Hairault, Langot and Sopraseuth, 2008).
3Stiglitz & Yun (2005) propose in a very diﬀerent framework that unemployed workers can borrow against
future pensions. In the case of incomplete ﬁnancial markets, this provides both insurance and eﬀective
incentives to all unemployed workers. There is nothing speciﬁc to older workers in their analysis.
3episode.
The paper is organized as follows: The next section reviews the literature on optimal
unemployment insurance. In Section 3, we describe the model. Section 4 presents the
calibration and the results. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
2 Related Literature
The optimal contract of unemployment insurance in a moral hazard environment was ﬁrst
studied by Shavell & Weiss (1979)4. Their main result is that an optimal contract is such
that the replacement ratio has to decrease throughout the unemployment spell. An extension
of this paper is provided by Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997) who introduce a new instrument
in the optimal contract: a wage tax after re-employment. They show that the optimal wage
tax increases with the unemployment spell. The main result of this paper is that the wage
tax improves the contract by signiﬁcantly reducing the cost to the principal. Shimer &
Werning (2003) show that Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997)’s results are robust to the nature of
the informational structure. They present a model where the moral hazard does not come
from the uncertainty about the search intensity, but about the reservation wage. They show
that the optimal replacement ratio is still decreasing with the length of the unemployment
spell as in Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997). From a methodological point of view, all these
papers hinge on the recursive contract literature as developed by Spear & Srivastava (1987),
Phelan & Townsend (1991), Abreu et al. (1990) and Atkeson & Lucas (1992).
Following these seminal papers, a growing literature has studied the optimal unemploy-
ment insurance contract. Recent contributions assume that workers are not ex-ante identical.
Hagedorn & Mennel (2002) propose reconsidering the optimal unemployment insurance when
heterogeneity comes from the fact that agents face diﬀerent search costs. In this model, there
are two types of agent, diﬀering in their probability of ﬁnding a job: the "good searchers"
have a high probability whereas the "bad searchers" have a low re-employment probability.
The principal cannot observe the agents’ type. Hagedorn & Mennel (2002) show that the
UI agency has to oﬀer two diﬀerent contracts: a contract for the “good" searchers which
is characterized by a decreasing replacement ratio, and a contract for the “bad" searchers
which has an upward-sloping beneﬁt proﬁle because of an adverse selection eﬀect.
The above papers examine the optimal contract in models where only the search behav-
ior is unobservable. Pavoni (2003) and Pavoni & Violante (2007) investigate the optimal
4We limit our review of the literature to papers that focus on labor supply. Cahuc & Lehmann (2000)
introduce labor demand through a matching process. In Cahuc and Lehmann, the “threatpoint" of the union
is the expected value of being laid oﬀ. Then, early UI payments might be kept low in order to decrease
the insiders’ power, while later UI payments could be more generous so as to improve unemployed workers’
welfare. In this case, UI payments increase with the unemployment duration. This is in contradiction with
the argument developed by Shavell & Weiss (1979), where the job search eﬀort is unobserved, implying a
decrease in the UI payments with the unemployment duration. Millard & Mortensen (1997) or Fredriksson
& Holmlund (2001) obtain this last result in job matching models. Coles & Masters (2006) show that the
introduction of strategic bargaining in a simple matching model (the job search eﬀort is observable) gives
some foundation for a decreasing UI payment.
4unemployment insurance when the human capital depreciates with unemployment duration.
Consequently, job oﬀers decrease during unemployment. In these models, the optimal un-
employment beneﬁts have to decrease with the length of the unemployment spell. However,
Pavoni (2003) and Pavoni & Violante (2007) show that unemployment insurance beneﬁts
are bounded below by a minimal "assistance" level.
Shimer & Werning (2008) study the optimal design of the unemployment insurance sys-
tem when the agent can save. The individual amount of savings are unobservable. If the
agents can save or borrow, it is not necessary to reduce unemployment insurance beneﬁts for
consumption to be decreasing. Unlike Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997), they show that the op-
timal contract can be characterized by constant beneﬁts. In our paper, we do not introduce
precautionary saving as in Shimer & Werning (2008). Their result hinges on an assumption
of a high degree of self-insurance and this assumption can be considered as extreme as the
restriction of no borrowing and no saving at all. There remains a lot of empirical evidence
along the lines of Gruber (1997) that displaced workers do suﬀer from a sizable decrease in
consumption.
To the best of our knowledge, no papers have so far investigated the optimal unemploy-
ment insurance for older workers. These latter expect that their average duration in the
labor market will be short because they are close to the retirement age. Consequently, the
expected returns on the search eﬀort are relatively low for older workers, and thus the opti-
mal search intensity decreases with age (see Hairault et al., 2008). Another important point
introduced by the ﬁnite life-time hypothesis is that employment can no longer be viewed as
a permanent state as in Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997): there is a deﬁnitive transition from
(un)employment to retirement. The introduction of a ﬁnite life-time horizon for the agents
implies ﬁrstly that unemployed workers can exit from unemployment without ﬁnding a job,
and secondly, that the employment duration can be short. For these older workers, the wage
tax incentive scheme is not eﬀective: this clearly suggests that social programs (unemploy-
ment beneﬁts and pensions) must be integrated. Stiglitz & Yun (2005) have proposed the
same integration strategy, but in a very diﬀerent framework and with no particular emphasis
on older workers. They support this idea as one way to counter the ﬁnancial market imper-
fections. In this paper, we show that this integration is an answer to the speciﬁc problem
posed by the short distance to retirement of older workers.
3 The model
Our objective is to determine the optimal timing of the UI beneﬁts for older workers in a
repeated moral-hazard environment. The ﬁrst-best solution is not reachable, due to infor-
mational asymmetries: the search eﬀort level is the agent’s own private information and the
planner has no way of monitoring this eﬀort level. The second-best allocation is such that the
principal (the UI agency) minimizes the expected discounted cost of the unemployment in-
surance, subject to two constraints: (i) to provide a certain lifetime utility level to the agent
when she becomes unemployed, and (ii) to respect the incentive compatibility constraints
5implying that the agent makes her own optimal decisions for search eﬀort and consumption
given the optimal timing of UI beneﬁts.
The originality of our analysis is to introduce a ﬁnite horizon for workers. For simplicity,
we present a model where workers are characterized by a given probability of retiring which
determines the expected horizon of the working life. We choose this stochastic aging structure
for computational reasons. This reduces the dimension of the discrete state variables. With
age as a deterministic and discrete state variable, the computational burden would have
dramatically increased.
3.1 The agent
In this section, we present the behavior of the (unemployed) agent characterized by her
preference and probability of retiring. If she ﬁnds a job in period τ, she is employed from
τ +1 until retirement, as jobs are permanent until retirement5. Once employed, the workers
receive a wage w each period. There is an exogenous exit from the labor market to retirement
and, once retired, individuals face a constant probability of dying.






where β < 1 denotes the intertemporal discount factor, cτ consumption at time τ, and aτ
the job search intensity. The stochastic event zτ in this economy describes the age of the
agent and labor market transitions: hence, the history of events at time τ is denoted zτ and
gives the age of the agent and her labor market occupation. The unconditional probability
of zτ, when z0 has not been realized, is denoted by φ(zτ).
The instantaneous utility function u(.) is increasing, twice diﬀerentiable, strictly concave





where σ is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. The probability of receiving a job of-
fer depends on the level of search intensity. This probability is given by an exponential
distribution:
π(a) = 1 − exp(−ψ.a)
with ψ > 0. This hazard function is increasing, strictly concave, twice diﬀerentiable and
satisﬁes the Inada conditions.









e(t)) + (1 − π(a(t)))V
u(t + 1)] + λwV
r
￿￿
5Assuming that employment is permanent simpliﬁes the analysis and is consistent with the literature.
6where t denotes the length of the unemployment spell and b(t) the level of the unemployment
compensation after t period of unemployment. V e(τe(t)) and V r denotes the value function
for an employed worker and a retiree respectively. λw is the probability for a worker to
become a retiree and τe(t) denotes the tax paid by the employed worker. As in Hopenhayn
& Nicolini (1997), we assume that this tax depends on the length of the past unemployment
spell t.
The optimal search intensity is then given by:
1
π￿(a(t))
= β(1 − λw)[V
e(τ
e(t)) − V









The right hand side of equation (1) states that, for a given gap between the employment
and the unemployment value functions, when the individual ages, the incentives to search
decrease as the probability of remaining in employment (1 − λw), which determines the
employment duration, decreases with age. Moreover, as the retirement age gets closer, the
gap between employment and unemployment value functions narrows, since they depend on
the same retirement value. The return on the job search eﬀort is then lowered when the
distance to retirement decreases.
The employed worker value function takes into account the probability of retiring λw and
is the solution of the following Bellman equation:
V
e(τ








An employed worker is assumed to receive a constant wage w (net of the disutility of working).
A retiree receives a pension p and faces a probability of dying λr. The Bellman equation for
a retiree is then given by:
V
r = u(p) + β(1 − λr)V
r
where λr denotes the probability of death6.
3.2 The principal
We consider a risk-neutral planner (the principal) providing the risk-averse agent with an
optimal unemployment compensation scheme. The principal cannot observe the search in-
tensity a(t), but knows the economic environment, in particular the hazard function π(a).
On the other hand, the principal perfectly observes and controls workers’ consumption: the
consumption of employed workers through the wage tax and that of unemployed workers
through the unemployment beneﬁt.
As in Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997), the contract is 2 vectors B = {(b(1),b(2),...,b(T))}
and T e = {(τe(1),τe(2),...,τe(T))}, where b(t) and τe(t) are respectively the beneﬁt level
6At this stage, no pension taxes are considered.
7and taxes after t periods of unemployment. Given these vectors, the agent maximizes her
intertemporal utility by choosing a vector of search intensity Ai = {(a(1),a(2),...,a(T))}
where a(t) is the search intensity after t periods of unemployment.
The objective of the principal is to minimize its total expenditures, under two constraints:
(i) a given expected utility V u(1) for a newly unemployed worker (the promise-keeping
constraint), and (ii) an incentive-compatibility constraint:
C(V u(t)) = minC {b(t) + β(1 − λw)[(1 − π(a(t)))C(V u(t + 1)) + π(a(t))Ge(t + 1)]}
subject to
V u(t) = u(b(t)) − a(t)
+β {(1 − λw)[π(a(t))V e(τe(t)) + (1 − π(a(t)))V u(t + 1)] + λrV r}
and
1 = βπ￿(a(t))(1 − λw)[V e(τe(t)) − V u(t + 1)]
where C ≡ {b(t),a(t),V u(t+1),τe(t)} and Ge(t+1) represents the discounted sum of taxes
paid by an individual if she ﬁnds a job. This discounted sum of taxes depends on the
expected duration of this job and so on the probability of retirement. This is deﬁned as
follows:
G
e(t + 1) =
−τe(t)
1 − β(1 − λw)
For any unemployment spell t, a given contract is deﬁned by an expected discounted utility
V u(t) and an expected discounted cost of unemployment beneﬁt C(V u(t)). Diﬀerent con-
tracts {B,T e} can provide the same initial utility V u(1) to the agent, but with diﬀerent costs
C(V u(1)) to the principal. The optimal contract minimizes the cost of the unemployment
insurance and guarantees the same ex-ante lifetime utility V u(1) = V u.
3.3 Calibration
This model is calibrated on a monthly basis. We set the discount factor β to 0.993. Following
Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997), the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion equals σ = 0.5. The
average length of retirement is set to 20 years. A retiree then dies with probability λr =
(1/(20 × 12)). The number n of years prior to retirement is the key parameter and will be
changed in order to measure how unemployment insurance aﬀects the search behavior as
individuals get closer to retirement (λw = 1/(n × 12)).
We normalize the wage w at 100, so that the unemployment beneﬁt equals the replace-
ment rate. The latter ¯ b is set at 50, which is the average replacement ratio for individuals
eligible for unemployment insurance (as computed by the French unemployment insurance
agency). The pension level is calibrated to p = 70, which is consistent with the replacement
ratio observed for French retirees in the late 1990s for an individual in the private sector with
an earning history corresponding to the average wage proﬁle (Charpin, 1999; COR, 2001).
We choose to calibrate the search eﬃciency ψ on the seniors who are not exempt from
job-search requirements. The search eﬃciency ψ is then set at 0.0045 so as to replicate the
average unemployment spell for individuals aged 50-55 with ¯ b = 50 (11 months according to
the French unemployment insurance agency).
8Figure 1: Search eﬀort as a function of the number of years prior to retirement

























4 The impact of the short horizon on the traditional
optimal UI contracts
In this section, we analyze the optimal UI contract for various horizon before retirement. As
a benchmark, we ﬁrst analyze the impact of the horizon in the context of constant beneﬁts.
Then, we introduce the optimal contract when the unemployment beneﬁt b(t) varies with
the unemployment spell and without taxes after re-employment (τe(t) = 0). Finally, we
introduce the taxes after re-employment.
4.1 Distance to retirement and search: the case of constant UI
beneﬁts
In a setting with constant unemployment beneﬁts, individuals’ search behavior depends on
the number of years prior to retirement (Figure 1). The search eﬀort increases with the size
of the horizon prior to retirement.
When individuals are far away from retirement (more than 4 years and 5 months), the
search eﬀort is strictly positive. Even though unemployment beneﬁts remain constant what-
ever the length of unemployment spell, individuals are enticed to look for a job because, if
they ﬁnd one, the gains from employment will be enjoyed for a long time. This is no longer
the case when they are close to retirement (less than 4 years and 5 months). Individuals no
longer look for a job, resulting in a zero job ﬁnding rate. It is not worthwhile looking for a
job because the individual will enjoy the gains from employment for only a short period. The
next section investigates whether the unemployment insurance agency can entice workers to
search for a job at the end of the working life. The eﬀectiveness of the incentive policy can be
9Figure 2: Downward sloping unemployment beneﬁts
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measured by the number of years prior to retirement at which individuals stop looking for a
job. With constant unemployment beneﬁts, individuals who are 4 years and 5 months away
from retirement have a zero search eﬀort. Eﬃcient incentive policies may entice individuals
who are closer to retirement (less than 4 years and 5 months) to actually look for a job.
4.2 The case of downward sloping unemployment beneﬁts
As in Shavell & Weiss (1979), the unemployment insurance agency can choose the proﬁle
of unemployment beneﬁts as a function of the length of the unemployment spell. Figure 2
displays the optimal replacement ratio when the individual is at diﬀerent distances to the
retirement age. With 10 years to wait before retirement, the optimal UI is downward sloping
while it becomes completely ﬂat at 4 years and 2 months before retirement. As in Shavell &
Weiss (1979), 10 years away from retirement, the optimal time sequence of unemployment
beneﬁts displays a downward slope, which punishes unemployed workers who do not ﬁnd
a job, thereby giving them a strong incentive to put eﬀort into the search process. The
high replacement ratio at the beginning of the unemployment spell reconciles the incentive-
compatibility constraint with the promise-keeping constraint. The shorter the horizon on the
labor market, the steeper the unemployment beneﬁt proﬁle, at least until a threshold age. As
the individual gets closer to the retirement date, individuals search less due to the distance
eﬀect (see section 4.1). The return on the search eﬀort goes down with age as the gains of
10re-employment will be enjoyed for a shorter time. The incentive constraint then requires
a sharper punishment to individuals who do not ﬁnd a job: the downward sloping beneﬁt
curve shifts to the right. The higher replacement ratio for newly unemployed individuals
compensates for a steeper fall for longer unemployment spells.
But this incentive policy succeeds in inducing only a little more search eﬀort for individ-
uals at the end of the working life. With optimal contracts, the zero search eﬀort appears
for individuals who are 4 years and 2 months away from retirement (Figure 2). For those
individuals, UI beneﬁts are the same from one period to the next. The gain associated with
the optimal contract is then small. Without optimal contracts, individuals with less than
4 years and 5 months before retirement had a zero search eﬀort (Figure 1). The economic
mechanisms behind this result are straightforward. The short distance prior to retirement
intrinsically limits the eﬀectiveness of decreasing unemployment beneﬁts. As those individu-
als near retirement face a low return on their search eﬀort, a sharp decline in unemployment
beneﬁts would then be needed to entice those workers to look for a job, which would imply
a high replacement ratio at the beginning of the unemployment spell. However, such a strat-
egy is actually ineﬃcient because the insurance agency would pay particularly high beneﬁts
today and promise particularly low beneﬁts to individuals who will retire soon. The short
horizon does not allow the agency to implement the highly decreasing proﬁle as the nearly
retired unemployed workers rationally expect to never suﬀer from the punishment, whereas
they would beneﬁt from high present beneﬁts. This result provides an economic rationale
behind the unconditional unemployment beneﬁts available to older workers in some Euro-
pean countries: unconditional income to old inactive individuals (for example the Dispense
de Recherche d’emploi in France), or disability and pre-retirement programs available in
Belgium and the Netherlands (see OECD 2006 for more details of these programs).
4.3 Introducing the wage tax after re-employment
The previous subsection investigated the optimal insurance contract without taxes after re-
employment. We now explore the design of insurance contracts à la Hopenhayn & Nicolini
(1997) with a wage tax after re-employment whose magnitude will depend on the length of
past unemployment spell. In Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997), this tax constitutes a powerful
tool since it implies a permanent decrease or increase on the re-employment wage, whose
magnitude depends on the duration of past unemployment.
We show that imposing a tax on the future job along the lines of Hopenhayn & Nicolini
(1997) is particularly eﬃcient in the context of older workers because the agency can now
reward the job search by present employment subsidies (a negative tax after re-employment).
The shorter the horizon, the higher the subsidy because the employment duration is short.
It must be emphasized that the carrot dimension is more crucial than the stick in the context
of older unemployed workers.
Figure 3 displays the unemployment insurance scheme for individuals who diﬀer in terms
of distance to retirement. As in Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997), with a long horizon prior to
retirement, unemployment beneﬁts display a ﬂatter proﬁle compared with the case without
11Figure 3: Optimal insurance with a re-employment tax
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12tax on wages (Figure 2). Indeed, the principal now has two policy instruments to induce
unemployed workers the to put eﬀort into the search process and smooth the unemployed
worker’s consumption. By taxing future wages, individuals are encouraged to look for a job
while the slow decline in unemployment beneﬁt ensures a smoother consumption. Actually,
the principal rewards individuals who quickly ﬁnd a job with a subsidy. Finally, as the
shorter the horizon before retirement, the shorter the re-employment period, the subsidy
must therefore be more generous in the case of a quick exit from unemployment. On Figure
2, the tax schedule is then steeper for individuals who are closer to retirement.
The optimal policy is modiﬁed for individuals who are the closest to retirement. With
the tax on wages, the principal can give a large subsidy if the unemployed worker rapidly
ﬁnds a job. Nevertheless, the expected duration horizon during which this subsidy can be
provided is short. Given the concavity of the agent utility, this strategy would imply such a
huge subsidy that it is too costly for the UI agency. The optimal contract à la Hopenhayn &
Nicolini (1997) becomes ineﬀective when considering people suﬃciently close to retirement.
Then, for the principal, the only policy instrument left is the constant unemployment beneﬁt.
People who are 2 years and 8 months away from retirement do not search for a job since,
should they ﬁnd one, the gains from employment would be enjoyed for a very short time.
For individuals who are close enough to retirement, adding the wage tax does not succeed
in inducing a positive search eﬀort. Again, the short horizon also limits the eﬀectiveness of
incentive policies proposed by Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997).
4.4 Sensitivity analysis
The ineﬃciency of the optimal unemployment insurance policy to induce some older workers
to search for a new job is intrinsic to the short distance to retirement. In this section, we show
that this result is robust to changes in parameters, even if the age at which the policy becomes
ineﬃcient depends on the calibration. This sensitivity analysis allows us to unveil some
interesting features of the distance to retirement eﬀect for the optimal unemployment beneﬁt
scheme. To illustrate the mechanisms at work, we look for the horizon before retirement at
which individuals cease to look for a job.
The risk aversion parameter σ determines the job search intensity. With a lower risk
aversion (σ = 0.45 versus 0.5 in the benchmark calibration, panel a in Table 1), older
workers are more inclined to search for a job. The job search intensity is positive until 3
years and 4 months, whereas this age threshold is higher in the benchmark case. On the
other hand, the relative eﬀectiveness of the diﬀerent contract is not much altered by the value
of the risk aversion parameter. It must, however, be emphasized that taking into account
subsidies on re-employment is relatively more eﬃcient when the risk aversion is low. Indeed,
the re-employment subsidy is a risky strategy, especially when the retirement age is close.
The eﬀectiveness of incentive policies is also aﬀected by the average beneﬁt ratio (panel
b in Table 1). With lower unemployment beneﬁts (¯ b = 0.4 versus ¯ b = 0.5 in the benchmark
calibration), individuals are more motivated to look for a job since they cannot aﬀord to
cease searching, even when retirement is close. In contrast, with a generous income when
13Table 1: Sensitivity Analysis
a. Risk Aversion
σ = 0.55 σ = 0.50 σ = 0.45
(1) (2) (3)
Benchmark
Constant UB 5 years and 11 months 4 years and 5 months 3 years and 4 months
Downward
sloping UB 5 years and 7 months 4 years and 2 months 3 years and 1 month
Downward sloping
UB and wage tax
3 years and 1 month 2 years and 8 months 1 year and 9 months
b. Average replacement ratio
¯ b = 40 ¯ b = 50 ¯ b = 60
(1) (2) (3)
Benchmark
Constant UB 3 years and 3 months 4 years and 5 months 6 years and 5 months
Downward
sloping UB 3 years and 1 month 4 years and 2 months 5 years and 10 months
Downward sloping
UB and wage tax
2 years and 1 month 2 years and 8 months 4 years and 3 months
14unemployed (¯ b = 0.6), the distance eﬀect is stronger: the search eﬀort falls as early as
6 years and 5 months prior to retirement with constant unemployment beneﬁts. These
results come from the interaction between the distance to retirement and the generosity of
the unemployment beneﬁts already discussed in Hairault, Langot and Sopraseuth [2008].
More generous unemployment beneﬁts naturally give more eﬃciency to policies introducing
incentives to search for a job more intensively. The incentive policy à la Hopenhayn &
Nicolini (1997) allows the agency to reduce the age threshold by more than 2 years with
b = 0.6.
5 Integrating SS and UI programs
Faced with the short horizon of older workers on the labor market, the unemployment beneﬁt
agency could take advantage of the retirement period to introduce taxes on pensions in order
to reintroduce more incentives to job search at the end of working life. In this section, we
explore the beneﬁts of integrating the unemployment insurance with the pension system as
recently suggested by Stiglitz & Yun (2005). Hereafter, we assume that the unemployment
agency can tax wages after re-employment as well as pension. The tax on pensions may
constitute a powerful policy instrument. Indeed, the integration of the SS and UI programs
is a natural way to increase the horizon of older unemployed workers. While the tax on future
wages only operates during a short period (a few years prior to retirement), the pension tax
aﬀects the individual’s income during all the retirement period (calibrated to 20 years on
average).
5.1 The optimal contract in a ﬁnite-horizon model
We assume that the principal can transfer incomes from the retirement periods to the periods
when the agent participates in the labor market. The principal chooses a contract now de-
ﬁned by 3 vectors of instruments B = {(b(1),b(2),...,b(T))}, T e = {(τe(1),τe(2),...,τe(T))}
and T r = {(τr(1),τr(2),...,τr(T))}, where τr(t) is the tax paid by a retiree if her last unem-
ployment spell has a length equal to t periods. We assume that the taxes paid as employee
can be diﬀerent from the ones paid as retiree because the income is not the same in these
two life stages. The principal’s program is now given by:
C(V u(t)) = minC
￿




V u(t) = u(b(t)) − a(t)
+β
￿




1 = βπ￿(a(t))(1 − λw)[V e(τe(t)) − V u(t + 1)]
15where C ≡ {b(t),a(t),V u(t+1),τe(t),τr(t)}. Gs(t+1), for s = e,r represents the discounted
sum of taxes paid by an individual as employee and/or as retiree. This discounted sum of
taxes is deﬁned as follows:
G




1 − β(1 − λw)
(2)
G
r(t + 1) =
−τr(t)
1 − β(1 − λr)
(3)
Equations (2) and (3) show that the horizon during which the principal receives taxes is
longer than in the UI contract limited to wage taxes. When an employee becomes a retiree,
she keeps on paying taxes; when an unemployed worker becomes a retiree without being an
employee before, she starts to pay taxes. Let us redeﬁne the value of a retiree as follows:
V
r(τ
r(t)) = u(p − τ
r(t)) + β(1 − λr)V
r(τ
r(t))
5.2 Optimal unemployment insurance with a pension tax after
retirement
Figure 4 shows the results for the contract integrating unemployment insurance and pension
systems. The optimal pension tax increases with the length of unemployment spells. The
pension tax constitutes an additional policy tool: unemployed individuals who quickly ﬁnd
a job can be rewarded with a subsidy on the pension that will be paid over a 20 year period
on average. A quick return to employment is rewarded with a higher pension while a long
unemployment spell results in a fall in old age income. The decline in pension constitutes a
strong incentive for unemployed workers to look for a job since the pension tax will apply
during the whole retirement period.
Figures 3 (with wage tax) and 4 (with both wage and pension taxes) show that the
introduction of pension taxes signiﬁcantly lowers the number of years prior to retirement at
which individuals cease to look for a job (1 year and 11 months in Figure 4 versus 2 years
and 8 months in Figure 3 and 4 years and 2 months in Figure 2). The pension tax removes
the distance eﬀect which intrinsically limited the eﬀectiveness of incentive policies in Shavell
& Weiss (1979). It strengthens Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997)’s strategy of considering the
after-unemployment history. Moreover, the introduction of an additional tax on pension
allows the unemployment agency to implement a smoother consumption proﬁle: ﬁrst, the
unemployment beneﬁt proﬁle is ﬂatter and, secondly, there are positive taxes during the
employment spell which transfer income toward retirement (Figure 4).
Only individuals who are at 1 year and 11 months away from retirement are now char-
acterized by constant optimal unemployment beneﬁts. For individuals who are very close
to retirement, incentives are still ineﬀective, even in the case of pension taxes. It must be
emphasized that the pension tax is strictly positive for these workers. By taxing the retire-
ment pension, the planner can improve consumption smoothing by transferring income from
a period when individuals are better-oﬀ (retired) to a period when they suﬀer from a low
16Figure 4: Optimal insurance with a tax on re-employment and on pension
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17Figure 5: Cost of UI (cost in terms of monthly wage)
















tax on re-empl. and pension
income (unemployed). This allows the social planner to grant more generous unemployment
beneﬁts (67% in Figure 4 versus 50% in Figure 3). Indeed, the planner has two objectives:
providing both insurance and incentives.
5.3 Cost of alternative optimal policies
In this section, we compare the cost of each unemployment insurance policy according to
the horizon of a unemployed worker until retirement (Figure 5).
Let us ﬁrst analyze the right hand side of Figure 5, for individuals who are far away
from retirement (5 years and more). Figure 5 conﬁrms Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997)’s con-
clusions: the constant unemployment scheme is the most expensive policy as unemployed
workers search for a job without any incentive schemes. Introducing downward sloping un-
employment beneﬁts allows the principal to cut the costs, which are even further reduced
by the introduction of the re-employment tax. The incentive policy is indeed more eﬀective
when the unemployment agency imposes a tax on the re-employment wage for individuals
far away from retirement: the decrease in the expected unemployment duration leads to a
fall in the costs of the unemployment insurance contract. In contrast with Hopenhayn &
Nicolini (1997), the gains obtained thanks to the introduction of a tax after re-employment
(Shavell & Weiss (1979) versus Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997) incentive schemes) do not ex-
ceed those provided by the decreasing proﬁle of the unemployment beneﬁts (ﬂat UB versus
18Shavell & Weiss (1979) incentive schemes). As, in a ﬁnite life-time setting, the job duration
is limited, the eﬃciency of the re-employment tax is lowered. Integrating the Social Security
and Unemployment Agency, by pushing away the horizon of both the agent and the princi-
pal, then leads to decreasing the costs with a magnitude more in line with that obtained by
Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997).
Let us now focus on the left hand side of Figure 5. For individuals who are at the very end
of their working life (1 year and 11 months away fromretirement and less), none of the policies
mentioned above succeed in encouraging a positive search eﬀort. A ﬂat unemployment policy
is optimal. Then, all policies result in the same cost level. Flat unemployment beneﬁts is
an expensive policy because the unemployed workers do not search for a job. The cost
of constant beneﬁts falls as the individual gets closer to retirement since the duration of
unemployment goes down.
When individuals are between 1 year and 11 months and 2 years and 8 months years
away from retirement, the contracts à la Shavell & Weiss (1979) or à la Hopenhayn &
Nicolini (1997) fail to encourage a positive search eﬀort. The costs are then similar across
the constant UB, downward sloping UB and tax on re-employment policies. On the other
hand, the policy where both taxes on re-employment and on pension are taken into account
succeeds in making those workers look for a job, leading to a signiﬁcantly lower cost. As
more than 50% of French older workers between 55 and 59 are not employed, this gives a
potentially high cost saving which the Welfare State could generate by implementing this
policy.
When the horizon before retirement is between 2 years and 8 months and 4 years and
2 months, the re-employment tax allows the principal to generate a signiﬁcant decrease in
the costs of the unemployment insurance contract. For these older unemployed workers,
the Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997)’s policy dominates that of Shavell & Weiss (1979) by
subsidizing the short re-employment spell. However, it is still more costly than the strategy
of integrating SS and UI programs.
6 Conclusion
The existence of speciﬁc insurance programs for older workers in many European countries
which leads them to retire early from the labor market is often viewed as responsible for the
low employment rate at these ages. This paper shed light on this question in the framework
initiated by Shavell & Weiss (1979) and Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997). We show that the
short distance to retirement implies strong speciﬁcities which can justify renouncing to the
incentive part of the optimal unemployment beneﬁts and focusing on the insurance part.
Whereas the optimal strategy of the unemployment agency is to propose beneﬁts decreasing
with the unemployment spell for older workers who have to wait several years prior to
retirement, the optimal contract becomes completely ﬂat when retirement is imminent: it
results from the ineﬃciency of incentives contract when the horizon of both the agent and
the principal is very short. We then provide some theoretical foundations for the generous
19insurance programs put in place, for instance in France, for older workers. We also show
that the ineﬃciency zone could be reduced by introducing a tax on pension. This tax is the
appropriate tool to oﬀset the eﬀects of the expected short job duration at the end of the
working cycle. It plays an equivalent role in a ﬁnite working life-time setting to the tax on
re-employment proposed by Hopenhayn & Nicolini (1997).
This paper puts forward the view that the normal retirement age is a key institution
that governs both search behavior and optimal unemployment beneﬁts provided by the un-
employment agency. Delaying the retirement age could increase older workers’ employment
rate and would translate to older ages the problem created by the proximity to retirement.
Finally, this paper emphasizes that the age issue cannot be reduced to the biological age:
the social age deﬁned by a distance to the normal retirement age is the key dimension for
positive as well as normative analysis.
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